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Resistance in the Time of Cholera: The Limits of
Stabilization through Securitization in Haiti
NICOLAS LEMAY-HE´BERT
The United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) is the latest of seven UN
missions in the country, stretching over 20 years of international involvement. If the UN’s
Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission has had a ‘stabilizing’ influence on the country fol-
lowing Aristide’s forced exile since 2004, a string of sexual scandals and the cholera
scandal has progressively contributed to modify the local perception of the mission, seen
as yet another foreign ‘occupation’ in Haiti. This article argues that while the resistance
to the UN in Haiti is clearly contextual – linked to certain events and actions of certain
individuals – it is also, and more fundamentally, structural in form. The article explores
themes around the local resistance encountered by the UN in Haiti, using James Scott’s
multi-levelled approach of the landscape of resistance to highlight the complex nature of
statebuilding in Haiti, while linking the more recent form of resistance to MINUSTAH
to the specific securitization approach adopted by the mission and its restrictive mindset.
Introduction: The Limits of the Failed State Framework for Haiti
While Haiti has been hard-hit by a number of catastrophes over the years – a mix
of man-made and natural factors coming into play – the earthquake of 12
January 2010 brought a degree of international attention that no one in the
small island had seen before. The degree of infrastructural destruction and
human life lost warranted this extraordinary attention: estimates oscillate
between 200,000 and 300,000 persons injured and 65,000 to 316,000 deaths;
most of the state apparatus was destroyed and infrastructural destruction
extended to the cities of Leogane, Grand-Goaˆve, Petit-Goaˆve, Jacmel and Care-
four. While estimates provide more a ‘rough indication of the situation’1 than
anything else, some three million people are believed to have been affected in
some way by the earthquake. Everyone felt concerned about the fate of the Hai-
tians, and the phrase ‘today we are all Haitians’ emerged as a persistent refrain
that reflected both the unprecedented character of the event, and the international
response to it. International volunteers came from almost every region of the
world, turning Port-au-Prince, already described as the capital of the ‘Republic
of NGOs’ before the earthquake2 into a ‘wounded city mobbed with rescue
and relief workers’.3 More than US$10 billion of aid was promised at the Mon-
treal Conference, and even if only a portion of the aid has actually been disbursed
so far, the consensus was that Haiti was in dire need of a ‘Marshall-like’ plan.4
However, international involvement has increasingly been greeted by ambiva-
lence in Haiti, and this initial reluctance has progressively taken the form of active
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resistance, with the United Nations as the focal point of attention in the process,
going back even before the earthquake. Following a string of sexual scandals
involving UN peacekeepers, and, perhaps more crucially, following the cholera
scandal that rocked the United Nations – the Nepalese contingent being
described as a potential source of the cholera outbreak in October 2010 – the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’s ‘capital of legiti-
macy’ has quickly floundered. In this context, and as will be explored in more
detail below, local actors started to openly criticize the United Nations, referring
to it as a ‘force of occupation,’ sensing perhaps that there was gain to be made at
the expense of the international organization. Quite tellingly, in his last speech to
the United Nations Security Council President Pre´val criticized MINUSTAH for
not adapting quickly enough to the new situation, stating that the international
intervention in Haiti has ‘practically led to 11 years of military presence in a
country that has no war’.5 I argue that this apparent ‘bifurcation’ between inter-
national and local agendas6 is at the heart of both Haiti’s alternative paradigms of
development as well as the debate surrounding possible international involvement
in Haiti, which has long been described as a perennial ‘failed state’.7 However, it
can be argued that this specific discourse fixes culpability on Haitian society, ren-
dering it dysfunctional while at the same time ‘casting international rescue inter-
ventions as functional’.8
While it may appear intuitive to label Haiti failed – after all, everyone recog-
nizes, local politicians included, that the Haitian state is not up to the task –
semantics has tangible implications, and maybe more importantly, specific limit-
ations.9 I suggest four limitations here as applied to the specific case of Haiti,
which will inform the theoretical stance of this article. First, as already noted,
the failed state discourse tends to underplay international factors in the failed sta-
tebuilding process. When the ‘failed state’ discourse meets the ‘empty shell
approach’10 – where infrastructural destruction is equated with societal bank-
ruptcy – it suddenly legitimizes all forms of international intervention, providing
‘an open season on institutional invention’.11 While this discourse12 has offered a
convenient legitimization basis for the setting of international administrations in
the past,13 the same discourse has also emerged in the context of Haiti, with pleas
for the setting-up of international trusteeships as the solution to ‘Haiti’s misery’.14
There is no way around the fact that international factors played and still play an
integral role in the failed statebuilding process in Haiti; actually Haiti’s failed
state status is not only a story of lack of governance, but also the product of
‘too much governance’.15
Second, the failed state discourse takes the OECD’s list of ‘developed
countries’ as the standard against which other states are measured, in the
process ignoring the specificities of the state formation process. ‘Failed states’
are thus understood as falling short of specific standards of social, political,
and economic performance. In this context, the expressions ‘failed’ or ‘failing
state’ seem to be a convenient neologism describing nothing more than a state
with low standards of living, a country that has not attained the same level of
development – measured as the public goods provision of state institutions –
as the ‘developed world’.16 Haiti went through a very specific process of state
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formation – one could argue that it is the case for every political community –
which will be quickly summarized in the next section, and thus understanding
Haiti only in terms of indicators of state capability obscures more than it reveals.
Third, the failed state discourse, by isolating local factors of fragility from
structural and international ones, and by focusing almost exclusively on state
capacity (or the lack thereof), encourages and promotes a technocratic approach
to statebuilding. Success for an international intervention is defined through
various technical benchmarks, which can make David Malone and Sebastian
von Einsiedel say for instance that ‘the case of Haiti presents an instance in
which UN operations were broadly successful – yet the patient failed to
recover’.17 The ‘technocratization’ of international statebuilding (and SSR as
part of it) in turn leads to cases of attention-deficit disorder for international
actors and undue compartmentalization of programmes, focusing on specific
benchmarks (number of police officers trained at the academy, number of
arrests, etc.) without taking into the broader picture of Haiti’s political evolution.
In this context, I agree with Paul Jackson that there is a strong case for linking
security sector reform and statebuilding together,18 which implies a degree of
understanding of the logics of integration and exclusion at the local level and
across time. These logics have often been neglected in the case of Haiti in
favour of traditional security and stability benchmarks.
Fourth and finally, the failed state discourse through the objectivzation of state
fragility promotes, consciously or unconsciously, a ‘one size fits all’ approach. Fol-
lowing diverse and numerous ‘lessons learned’ from various humanitarian inter-
ventions in the world and successful examples of development, plans for Haiti
have been tailored following Taiwan’s (‘Taiwan of the Caribbean’ discourse in
Duvalier’s time), post-tsunami Indonesia’s or the Dominican Republic’s experi-
ences.19 However, too few of these plans are truly specific to the Haitian context
and endogenous in their elaboration and application. Trying to do justice to the
vibrant literature on Haitian history, this article advances that it is simply imposs-
ible, or at least quite limiting, to attempt to understand the challenges, difficulties,
and accomplishments of MINUSTAH, as well as the local resistance to the inter-
national presence, without putting the mission back into the wider context of the
complex web of interrelations between international and national actors. For
resistance to international statebuilding projects is not a new phenomenon in
Haiti, and quite the contrary, it can be argued that it forms a constant in
Haitian history, fuelling and playing into social class struggles.
Using James Scott’s innovative approach of landscape of resistance, the first
section develops a three-staged approach to resistance that aims to highlight
the interplay between class struggles and between international and local
actors, with a specific focus on the security sector and SSR programmes con-
ducted in Haiti throughout the years. Through a cursory overview of Haiti’s pol-
itical development, including the background of class relations and the formation
of the postcolonial state, the middle ground of democratization and international
interventions (including seven peace missions), and a foreground of MINUSTAH,
the earthquake and the cholera outbreak, this article looks at factors structuring
the landscape of resistance in Haiti. Building on this analysis, the second section
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looks more specifically at the limits of the securitization-first approach adopted
by MINUSTAH since 2004 and its impact on the landscape of resistance.
Landscape of Resistance in Haiti
MINUSTAH’s official mandate as stated by United Nations Security Council Res-
olution 1542 (2004) is to ‘build state capacity’ by ‘extending state authority
throughout Haiti’ and by ‘ensur[ing] a stable and secure environment’.
However, in order to correctly assess its accomplishments and shortcomings in
terms of statebuilding, as well as the nature of the international-local relations
established over time, there is a need to further elaborate on the specific nature
of the Haitian state. Actually, the state – or, more precisely, its modern
Western fantasy – has never existed in Haiti, at least not as a coherent idea
binding citizens together and reflecting a Rousseauian social contract. It has con-
sistently been a platform for competing factions, vying for positions of power. It is
quite telling that pouvwa (power) in Haitian Creole refers to the ‘powers’ associ-
ated to a particular civic post or office, whereas a second concept that can be
understood as a translation of power, fo`s, this time refers to a broader definition
of ‘moral force’ of a community.20 Additionally, leta (the state) refers to powerful
individuals in Haitian Creole, regardless of their actual ties with the state appar-
atus, and the same word can mean ‘state’ or ‘bully’.21 To highlight the complex
nature of statebuilding in Haiti, and how it is embedded in class relations and
has been frequently influenced by outside interventions, I will use Scott’s ‘Neo-
Brodelian’ approach to the structural factors informing the study of resistance.
This, I hope, will enable me to shed an additional light on the agency of local
actors ‘to resist, ignore, engage with, disengage from, and exploit’ international
involvement,22 but also on the agency of and constraints on international
actors in their quest to ‘transform’ and ‘fix’ Haiti.
Background: Predatory State, the Security Sector and Class Relations
For Scott, the characteristic features of the background of the landscape of resist-
ance ‘create palpable limits to what, in the short run at least, is possible; they also
create opportunities and exert a determinate pressure on the nature of class
relations’.23 In the case of Haiti, this background enables us to understand resist-
ance ‘as a structural condition,’ rooted in existing conditions of poverty,24 but
also more specifically anchored in class struggles that have structured Haitian
society before and after independence. Three specific features of class struggles
permeate Haitian history from colonialism to the postcolonial state and help us
understand the dynamics of exclusion and resistance: 1) a hierarchical social
order – marked by racial tensions between white colonizers and African slaves
and ‘free people of colour’ in the colonial period, then between mulattos and
blacks after independence25 – and, more generally, social tensions between a pri-
vileged few and an impoverished majority; 2) an autocratic and militarized pol-
itical system, built on the colonial heritage, reinforced by international
encroachment and outright occupations, and crystallized in the development of
the Haitian predatory state and the predominance of the military establishment
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for most parts of the Haitian history; and 3) an export-oriented economy, from
the plantation system to the free trade regulations, clashing with the subsistence
agriculture model (subsistence farmers represent two thirds of the population).
Taken together and understood as the background of the landscape of class
struggles and resistance in Haiti, these features tell us a specific story made up
of local and international factors meshing together, producing a more nuanced
account of the logics often associated with the simplistic discourse on ‘failed
states’.
The struggle between Haiti’s impoverished majority (pe`p la in Haitian Creole)
and the wealthy few has been at the centre of Haitian politics before and after
independence. Politics has constantly been a zero-sum game, orchestrated by
‘predatory elites,’ a term coined by Robert Maguire to describe the peculiar
blend of gangsterism and populism that has defined the country’s political super-
structure for most of its history.26 Haiti became independent in 1804, but the
colonial legacy far outlasted the French colonial regime. Isolation on the inter-
national scene – the Haitian state was unevenly recognized by the international
community between 1804–1862 while there was a looming and constant
threat of military invasion by France up until 1825 – made Haiti’s independence
so insecure that early regimes devoted significant state resources to safeguarding
sovereignty to the detriment of the population’s overall welfare.27 To support the
costs associated with the military build-up and to perpetuate the elite entitlement
‘to obtain a work-free outcome out of the masses’ – the authoritarian habitus in
other words28 – the plantation system was retained and the new Haitian rulers
began to put the ex-slaves back on the plantations where they had to work
under military supervision.29 The temporary solidarity that had developed
among members of diverse ethnic backgrounds, classes, and status during the
war of liberation dissipated and was replaced by the ‘emergence of opportunistic
factions who exploited racial and class differences to maximize profits and self-
interest’.30 As Robert Fatton Jr. puts it, virtually all Haitian rulers looked at pol-
itical power ‘as a brutal, indivisible quantity that could be won collectively, but
that had to be kept individually and exercised absolutely’.31
Resistance in this context was almost structural for the impoverished
majority. Ex-slaves who composed the rural base could not easily be compelled
into a new servitude, and many chose to escape in a process called marronage.
The process of marronage – petit, implying deserting the plantation temporarily,
and grand, attempting to leave the plantation for good – echoes Scott’s concept of
everyday forms of peasant resistance, understood as ‘the prosaic but constant
struggle between the peasantry and those who seek to extract labor, food,
taxes, rents and interest from them’.32 While the plantation labour system
faced a steadfast resistance from the ‘counter-plantation’ system built around
self-sufficient agriculture,33 the ‘agrarian problem’ became the main driver of
the ‘historical fissure between a militaristic state of the few and the wider
society of the many’.34 There were a few open confrontations with authority
throughout the years, for instance uprisings took place in 1679, 1691, 1697,
1703, 1719, 1734 and 1751, and after independence, in 1844 (known as the
Piquet Revolt), but such outbreaks of violence were not typical35 and resistance
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was more ‘diffused’ and more rooted in the everyday. Finally, the patronizing,
top-down approach taken by US officials during the American occupation
(between 1915 and 1934) turned initial enthusiasm into animosity and
rancour;36 over time, resistance to American policies fuelled protests, strikes,
sabotage, and riots,37 culminating in the 1929 uprisings in Port-au-Prince and
Cap Haı¨tien, and a bloody repression by American troops. Hence, class struggles
between an impoverished majority and a privileged few – which permeated the
constitution of the predatory state in Haiti and the security sector associated
with it, and reinforced by international interventions – can be seen as constituting
the background of the landscape of resistance, enabling us to shed additional light
on the middle ground and foreground of the landscape of resistance.
Middle Ground: Perpetuation of Class Struggles, Democratization and UN
Involvement
The middle ground of the landscape of resistance in Haiti encompasses the
post-Duvalierist evolution of Haitian politics, marked by the rise of the popular
movement and numerous international interventions aimed at consolidating
democratization through the re-instalment of elected leaders (first Aristide admin-
istration 1994–1996) or their forced eviction (second Aristide administration
2001–2004). Haiti’s democratic transition formally began in 1986 after Jean-
Claude Duvalier went into exile. Indeed, the rise to power of the ‘popular move-
ment’ in 1991 (The Lavalas coalition, meaning ‘the flood’ – a word popularly
used for the deluge of water and mud which descends into the capital after a
storm) has clearly been one of the most potent symbols for progressive political
change in Haiti, and even arguably, in the entire world.38 However, this period
was still marked by constant social struggles between the political and economic
elite and the moun andeyo (or outsiders), those who are not considered part of the
nation and are excluded from its benefits and recognition.39
After an immediate period marked by a transitional military government
(‘Duvalierism after Duvalier’), Jean-Bertrand Aristide was triumphantly elected
president in 1991. The initial goal of Aristide was to challenge the hierarchical
fabric of Haitian society, an approach encompassed in his slogan tout moun se
moun (‘every human being is a human being’). However, less than eight
months after Aristide’s inauguration, a group of army officers organized a
coup, replacing the elected president with a military junta and sending him into
exile in the United States. Aristide’s reforms of the armed services and his steps
to create a distinct police force clearly led to unease in the army.40 It also has
to be said that from the first day of the post-Duvalier era, Haiti’s dominant
classes never ceased to oppose, undermine, and challenge Lavalas’ rule.41 The
‘international community’ responded with an embargo and international sanc-
tions on the leader of the military junta, Raul Ce´dras, which inadvertently
reinforced the dependency of the country on international economic aid. Aristide
returned to the presidency in 1994, with the backing of US troops and the UN,
and one of his first decisions was to dissolve the Forces Arme´es d’Haı¨ti (FADH
– Haitian Armed Forces). Another member of the Lavalas coalition, Rene´
Pre´val, was voted in as his successor in 1996, and Aristide returned for another
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term in 2001. However, a small group of former military officers took up arms
against Aristide, and this time the US did not support the elected president –
on the contrary, Aristide himself described the event as a kidnapping by the
US, France and Canada.
In this context, the UN and other international actors have constantly been
drawn into Haiti’s politics and have thus become principal actors in local politics.
A succession of security sector reform missions – UNMIH, UNSMIH, UNTMIH,
MIPONUH and MICAH – were deployed to Haiti to help the development of the
new Police Nationale d’Haı¨ti (PNH), as well as to support prison and judicial
reform. These missions were an integral part of the Haitian failed statebuilding
process, insisting for instance on the inclusion of former FADH personnel in
the new police force, which not only undermined the legitimacy of the new
police force in the eyes of large parts of the civilian population but also fuelled
corruption.42 The series of UN interventions following the re-instatement of Aris-
tide were all framed in a very technocratic way, ‘outside of development program-
ming’.43 Furthermore, the missions were inherently limited by their insufficient
understanding of the country’s history, society and culture.44 This had a direct
impact on the perceived legitimacy of the international interventions. At first,
many Haitians welcomed the peacekeepers, perceiving them as a new kind of
security force able to pull the country out of the horrors that had transpired
between 1991 and 1994,45 with a greater perception of legitimacy outside of
Port-au-Prince than in the capital city.46 Quickly enough though, the inter-
national peacekeepers’ legitimacy withered, when ‘blamed to a degree by the
populace for [the] actions’ of the Haitian security institutions.47 With the
massive arrival of foreign NGOs, the 1990s is also a period marked by the emer-
gence of scepticism about both the real impact of the aid apparatus, and the role
played by external actors in undermining social cohesion and state capacity.
Foreground: MINUSTAH, Security Sector Reform and the Cholera Crisis
The foreground of the landscape of resistance covers the second exile of Aristide
and the establishment of MINUSTAH to initially support the transitional govern-
ment and then to pursue a security sector reform agenda. It also covers a period
characterized by a series of external and internal shocks, including the worldwide
food price inflation of 2008, numerous storms in 2004 and 2008, and the earth-
quake of 2010, which all led, in turn, to sporadic but intense concentration on
Haiti by donor agencies. Traditional fault lines between an impoverished
majority and a privileged few once again mark this period, with international
influence intertwined with local structures of power.
Following the second (forced) exile of Aristide, the international community
imposed a government of technocrats, headed by Ge´rard Latortue, to assure
the transition to the elections of 2006. The approach of the Latortue government,
and its domestic and foreign supporters (including the United Nations) was to use
a military solution to what is fundamentally a social problem, anchored in pro-
found social, economic and cultural inequalities.48 However, if we take into
account the historical process of state formation in Haiti, the central question
remains: what is the United Nations supposed to stabilize in Haiti? While the
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securitization of socio-political issues by the Latortue/MINUSTAH regime will be
detailed in the next section, it is possible to say that MINUSTAH relied on the
same old SSR practices that failed in the first instance.49 MINUSTAH actually
oversaw the same policy of incorporating ex-army paramilitaries into the police
force,50 thus contributing once again to the disputed process of state formation.
In general, police reform in Haiti since 2004 has followed a relatively narrow,
technical agenda, emphasizing training and vetting; an agenda that has been chal-
lenged by structural constraints and on-the-ground realities.51 Hence, there was
and still is no vision of a holistic SSR approach within MINUSTAH,52 which
sets the UN on a course to reinforce the same dynamics that caused tensions in
the first place.
In this context, the foreground of the landscape of resistance is both multiform
and complex. First it is hybrid in form and content, and not restricted to ‘local’
actors rejecting international hegemony, echoing the resistance process in other
locales such as Kosovo and Timor-Leste.53 Prominent international officials
have also voiced their opposition to current international policies.54 Second,
and in continuity with the past periods, the resistance is diffuse and not restricted
to the UN – it takes the shape of the fault lines dividing Haitian politics. For
instance, dissatisfaction with aid delivery was acute and spilled over into the pol-
itical arena in 2008; after the 2010 earthquake, the dissatisfaction was abundant
and not only within the camps.55 Also, due to the intertwinement of international
and local structures as discussed before, resistance is usually not restricted to one
actor, whether international or local. For instance, anti-UN demonstrations in
2010 also targeted Jules Celestin, Pre´val’s heir apparent.
Concerning the specific resistance to MINUSTAH since its establishment in
June 2004, many in Haiti felt that it represented a return to international occu-
pation, this time under a new disguise.56 The string of sexual scandals that
dogged the military components of MINUSTAH certainly contributed to the
anti-UN sentiment in Haiti: in 2007, 111 Sri Lankan soldiers have been repa-
triated on the grounds of sexual exploitation and the abuse of under-aged
minors;57 in January 2011, Pakistani troops were accused of the rape of a
young boy in Gonaı¨ves and sexual relations with minors in the capital; three of
them were later found guilty of sexual exploitation and abuse and were con-
demned to a one-year jail sentence.58 In July 2011, Uruguayan troops were
accused of sexually assaulting a young man in the southern town of Port-Salut
(while only being charged with ‘coercion’ charges).59 Echoing the various levels
of the resistance landscape described earlier, there was an amplification factor
at work with each scandal, building on the narrative of occupation in Haiti
and the latent hostility toward international troops in certain segments of the
society (especially the student circles in Port-au-Prince).60 This ‘legitimacy
issue’ was also further aggravated by a few public relations fiascos following
the 2010 earthquake, such as the hiring of two vessels to accommodate UN staf-
fers,61 which was perceived by some as an obscene demonstration of power and
wealth in the midst of the catastrophe, a story which echoes a similar scandal in
Timor-Leste in 1999.62 However, despite the sexual scandals and a few dubious
decisions by MINUSTAH leaders, this resistance was first and foremost
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structural. It should be noted that MINUSTAH was also a convenient scapegoat
for everything that went wrong in Haiti (and for the inaction of the Haitian gov-
ernment), echoing what has been dubbed the ‘legitimacy dilemma’ in earlier
work, where everything internationals try to do when put in a situation of auth-
ority turns against them.63
Support for the UN mission has been decreasing for a long time but it fell
sharply after the introduction of cholera.64 Opponents to MINUSTAH took
resistance to a whole new level with the cholera outbreak in October 2010, a
few months after the massive earthquake that levelled Port-au-Prince and sur-
rounding towns. The epidemic that started in Mirebalais in the Artibonite
region has killed more than 8,000 people since and infected over 670,000.
While the origin of the outbreak is still debated,65 but most likely to have origi-
nated in the UN Nepali camp,66 most Haitians have already firmly concluded that
the new pathogen was introduced by UN peacekeepers.67 The catastrophe,
described as the ‘Haitian 9–11’ by an interviewee,68 was also reinterpreted
with local signifiers, best suited to cope with such a traumatizing event. As one
Haitian official put it in an interview, ‘MINUSTAH is a houngan [vodou
priest], and behind the ougan hides the cholera’,69 while a second interviewee
mentioned how Haitians often observe that ‘MINUSTAH and cholera are
Marrasa [twins in Haitian vodou, endowed with supernatural powers]’.70
In such an explosive atmosphere, overt resistance did not take long to appear.
In effect, within weeks of the first cases, there were reports – some unconfirmed –
of crowds throwing stones at UN peacekeepers’ armoured personnel carriers and
of repeated clashes between Haitians and the UN forces, many ending in deaths.71
Following the news of the sexual scandals, protests have spread around Haiti, as
angry people took to the streets demanding that the United Nations get out of
their country. A number of surveys have been conducted, telling divergent
stories. The crackdown on ‘gangs’ in Bel Air and Cite´ Soleil, which will be
addressed in the next section, has, according to two surveys, dramatically
improved the sentiment toward the mission.72 However, after the cholera out-
break and the series of scandals that rocked the UN mission, a Columbia Univer-
sity survey conducted in 2011 showed that 65 per cent of Haitians living in the
metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince would like MINUSTAH to leave within a
year,73 while another survey conducted a year later has 72.2 per cent holding
similar opinion.74
MINUSTAH’s Securitization First Strategy and its Limits
International and local statebuilding practices were intertwined for most of
Haiti’s history, leading to hybrid governance structures, and hybrid resistance
to it. Hence, all statebuilding policies have repercussions for socio-political cohe-
sion, intentionally or not. The institutions, which external interveners help create,
affect the society as a whole, thus bringing outside actors into the sphere of
nation-building.75 As discussed earlier, security institutions in Haiti have tra-
ditionally played a crucial role, being central actors of governance especially
before the Duvaliers. Paramilitary institutions were also quite instrumental in
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the quest for power and protection in Haiti: from the tonton macoutes under
Franc¸ois Duvalier, to the attache´s in the immediate post-Duvalier era or the
pro-Aristide Chime`res (or chime`) and renegade anti-Aristide military officers
(regrouped under the Front for the Advancement and Progress of Haı¨ti and the
Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Haiti). In this context, externally-led
SSR policies in Haiti are fraught with risk, having to tread the fine line between
strengthening security institutions in a predatory statebuilding context and
trying to disarm paramilitary groups pursuing distinct political agendas (in a ‘con-
tinuation of politics by other means’ mind-set). In such a context, an ‘apolitical’
security reform process is simply not an option, despite the technocratic rhetoric
of certain international actors.
In a heavily politicized context of social struggle between Haiti’s impover-
ished majority and the wealthy few, accentuated by Aristide’s controversial
‘exile’ and a transitional government perceived as siding with the economic and
political elite (in fact, no Aristide supporter was included in the ‘national
coalition’), MINUSTAH’s SSR approach to strengthen security institutions and
to disarm rebels was doomed to be seen as highly partisan, and in continuity
with past interventions and occupations. While MINUSTAH hesitantly chal-
lenged the hegemonic presence of the disbanded Haitian army in a few localities,
it used significantly more repressive means to curb the power of the Chime`res
(‘chimeras’) in Cite´ Soleil.76 In a context of increasing insecurity in Port-
au-Prince,77 MINUSTAH and the HNP proceeded to ‘clean’ the ‘difficult’
urban areas of Cite´ Soleil (or Cite´ Soley) and Bel Air. The joint MINUSTAH
and Latortue government’s approach was quite simply to equate all Chime`res
or ‘armed gangs’ with ‘Lavalas Chime`res’, and then these Chime`res with
bandits.78 UN forays in these areas to fight ‘bandits’ led to 100 wounded in
October 2005 and between 170 and 205 in December 2005. A half of these
persons were women and children,79 which, for MINUSTAH’s head of mission
Edmond Mulet, were mere ‘collateral damage’.80 As Robert Muggah notes, the
end result was that these muscular enforcement-led operations ‘appeared in
some cases both to disperse and simultaneously to radicalise youth and
so-called gangs’.81
There is no denying that insecurity became a major social issue in Haiti after
the departure of Aristide, that this hostility degenerated from political violence
aimed at the interim government, the PNH and MINUSTAH into more
random acts of violent crime and that MINUSTAH/PNH operations managed
to bring a modicum of stability in these areas. However, to look at the Chime`res
phenomenon, and the post-2004 surge of violence solely through a security lens is
limited at best. ‘Security issues’ are interwertined with political and economic
claims, brilliantly summarized by Madison Smartt Bell in the case of the
Chime`res: ‘before the term was coined, Haitian deliquent youths were called mal-
e´leve´ (“ill brought up”) or still more tellingly, sansmaman [“the motherless
ones”] ( . . . ). The Chime` were indeed chimeras; ill fortune left them as unrealized
shadows ( . . . ) These were the people Aristide had originally been out to salvage:
Tout moun se´ moun was his earliest motto’.82 This is an opinion confirmed by a
recent ethnographic study of the youth in Cite´ Soleil, whose main finding was that
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‘youth frame their experiences in terms of a broader social conflict between the
“included” and the “excluded”’.83 In this context, MINUSTAH is accused of
responding only to the symptoms of violence rather than the causes of the vio-
lence.84 As one interviewee mentioned, all UN reports look at the district [Bel
Air] strictly through the lens of violence.85
If MINUSTAH’s securitization first strategy has been predominant in Haiti –
by the number of troops involved (more than 8,000 uninformed personnel includ-
ing more than 6,000 troops) and by its role in Haiti’s security landscape – it is
worth noting that it is not the only approach existing in Haiti. An example of
an alternative approach to stabilization in Haiti is the ‘integrated security and
development programme’ in the Bel Air district by Viva Rio, a Brazilian
NGO.86 The programme aims to engage communities in an informal way and
to bring ‘gangs’ into a dynamic process of negotiation and dialogue between
themselves, and with the HNP and MINUSTAH. Another example is the Com-
munity Violence Reduction (CVR) programme, established in 2008 as an
attempt by MINUSTAH to do things differently, and which aims to create econ-
omic and social opportunities with a view to extracting former gang members
from violence.87 As the CVR team leader puts it, ‘we realised that the DDR strat-
egy was ill-adapted to the context, that local dynamics were more complex. ( . . . )
If the other sections will deal with the state, this section will focus on the commu-
nity-level’.88 As other CVR officers noted: ‘each time the military officers “screw
up,” we have to pick up the pieces. ( . . . ) We constantly have to stabilise a situ-
ation previously destabilised by military units’.89 It might be too soon to see it
as a ‘model for future interventions’90 – and we also need to be careful with
‘one size fits all’ mindsets – but this clearly represents an interesting evolution
in the security landscape in Haiti.
Conclusion
While insecurity in Haiti is quite marginal compared to other Latin American and
Caribbean countries, there is a wide agreement that the social structures that
played an important role in the post-Aristide surge of violence (known as
bazes) are still active and could resume their active resistance to international
and local governance structures91 – if only because the social chasm separating
the privileged few and the impoverished majority is as wide as it has ever been.
This article highlighted how class struggles, combined with continuous inter-
national involvement, have influenced Haiti’s political evolution since its inde-
pendence, an evolution that can be understood as a failed statebuilding process.
Building on James Scott’s innovative approach of landscape of resistance, the
article developed a three-stage approach to resistance (background, middle
ground, and foreground) and used this to examine the interplay between local
and international factors in the process in order to better understand the recent
wave of resistance to MINUSTAH. The article also focused on the evolution of
the security sector in Haiti in different stages of its political evolution, putting
in context MINUSTAH’s securitization first strategy and its limits in addressing
issues related to the social gap in Haiti.
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Haiti’s lack of proper sewage and sanitation system, exacerbated by the 2010
earthquake, and the deficiencies in the UN’s sanitation standards, which was
already an issue back in 2008,92 have been labelled a ‘perfect storm’ for the out-
break of a massive epidemic of cholera.93 While the ‘perfect storm’ theory has
been used by the UN to absolve itself from responsibility for the outbreak in a
context of a pending multimillion lawsuit,94 one could also use the ‘cholera out-
break as a perfect storm’ analogy to understand the nature of resistance to MIN-
USTAH, unveiling the limits of its securitization policy and the international role
in ‘strengthening’ what has always been a highly politicized security sector. Simi-
larly, debates surrounding the cholera outbreak in Haiti shed a new light on the
growing importance of the ‘unintended consequences’ issue in the context of
peacebuilding. There is a need to properly assess not only the positive aspects
of outside interventions, which are usually assessed through scores of ‘lessons
learned’ papers and scientific articles written by policy experts, but also the detri-
mental aspects of (sometimes massive) international presences, including the
impact on local economies and on local structures of governance. Haiti’s
cholera crisis has inadvertently put this agenda at the forefront of peacebuilding
debates.
In this context, there is a need to break from technocratic approaches to peace-
building and move toward a proper recognition of the social and political aspects
of peace consolidation in Haiti, which has been cursorily highlighted not only in
this article, but first and foremost in the existing literature on Haiti (in French
and in English). Paradoxically enough, a proper understanding of the social
divisions integral to Haiti’s past and present political development forces us to
put in perspective the opportunity for a quick exit of UN forces in Haiti. MINUS-
TAH has undoubtedly helped to ‘stabilise’ Haiti,95 even if in a very biased, parti-
san and political way. Had it not been for the UN’s presence, the transitional
government would probably have been engulfed in the 2004–2006 surge of
violence.96 Having said that, there is a need to move beyond ‘stabilization’ dis-
courses toward addressing structural violence, which require a comprehensive per-
spective on the intended and unintended impacts of international policies in Haiti.
In this context, the first step toward a change of paradigm in Haiti is to recognise
that international influences are integral parts of the de facto ‘social contract’ (or
lack thereof) in Haiti.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
A draft version of this article was presented at the workshop on ‘Security Sector Reform at a Cross-
roads’, Free University of Berlin, July 2013. The author would like to thank Ursula Schro¨der and
the participants for useful feedback and comments on the initial draft, as well as Jonathan Fisher,
Paul Jackson, Heather Marquette, and Robert Muggah. This work was supported by the Marie
Curie Actions, Project PEACE.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Nicolas Lemay-He´bert is a senior lecturer at the International Development Department, University of
Birmingham (UK). His research interests include peacebuilding and statebuilding, humanitarian
RESISTANCE IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA 209
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 01
:38
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
interventions in post-conflict or post-disaster contexts, and local narratives of resistance to inter-
national interventions. He recently co-edited with Nicholas Onuf, Vojin Rakic and Petar Bojanic
Semantics of Statebuilding: Language, Meanings and Sovereignty (Routledge, 2014). He is the co-
editor of the Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding.
NOTES
1. Mats Lundahl, The Political Economy of Disaster: Destitution, Plunder and Earthquake in Haiti,
London: Routledge, 2013, p.190.
2. Madeline Kristoff and Liz Panarelli, ‘Haiti: A Republic of NGOs?’ USIP Peacebrief 23, 26 Apr.
2010; Nikolas Barry-Shaw, ‘Haiti’s New PM and the Power of NGOs’, HaitiAction.net, 29 Sept.
2008.
3. Paul Farmer, Haiti After the Earthquake, New York: PublicAffairs, 2011, p.4.
4. However, while the Marshall plan represented approximately 2 per cent of France’s GDP over
three years, Haiti has received 8.2 per cent of its GDP in international aid between 1965 and
1995, de facto receiving more than four Marshall plans per year. Ste´phane Pallage and Michel
Robe, ‘Foreign Aid and the Business Cycle’, Review of International Economics, Vol.9, No.4,
2001, pp.641–672; Nicolas Lemay-He´bert and Ste´phane Pallage, ‘Aide Internationale et
De´veloppement en Haı¨ti: Bilan et Perspective [International Aid and Development in Haiti:
Outcome and Perspective]’, Haı¨ti Perspectives, Vol.1, No.1, 2012, pp.13–16.
5. Edith Lederer, ‘Departing Haiti Leader Faults UN’, Associated Press, 7 Apr. 2011.
6. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, ‘The Bifurcation of the Two Worlds: Assessing the Gap Between the
Internationals and Locals in State-Building Processes’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.32, No.10,
2011, pp.1823–41.
7. Competition is fierce in finding the most evocative concept to describe Haiti: from a nightmare,
predator, collapsed, failed, failing, parasitic, kleptocratic, phantom, virtual, or pariah state, to a
‘perennial failed state’ or even ‘a basket-case’.
8. Caroline Hughes and Vanessa Pupavac, ‘Framing Post-Conflict Societies: International Patholo-
gisation of Cambodia and the Post-Yugoslav States’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.26, No.6,
2005, p.873.
9. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, Nicholas Onuf and Vojin Rakic, ‘Introduction: Disputing Weberian
Semantics’, in: Nicolas Lemay-He´bert et al. (eds), Semantics of Statebuilding: Language, Mean-
ings and Sovereignty, London: Routledge, 2014, pp.1–15.
10. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, ‘The ‘Empty-Shell’ Approach: The Setup Process of International Admin-
istrations in Timor-Leste and Kosovo, Its Consequences and Lessons’, International Studies Per-
spectives, Vol.12, No.2, 2011, pp.190–211.
11. Jarat Chopra, ‘Building State Failure in East Timor’, Development and Change, Vol.33, No.5,
2002, p.981.
12. It has also been labelled the ‘monopoly model’ in the SSR literature. See: Mark Sedra, ‘Security
Sector Reform’, in Roger Mac Ginty (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding, London: Rou-
tledge, 2013, pp.211–24.
13. Lemay-He´bert (see n.10 above).
14. Conrad Black, ‘A Plan for Haiti’, National Post, 6 Feb. 2010; Don Bohning, ‘An International
Protectorate Could Bring Stability to Haiti’, Miami Herald, 23 Nov. 2004; Larry Brooks, ‘The
Underlying Tragedy’, The New York Times, 14 Jan. 2010; Johanna Mendelson-Forman, ‘Secur-
ity Sector Reform in Haiti’, International Peacekeeping, Vol.13, No.1, 2006, p.15.
15. Chelsey Kivland, ‘Unmaking the State in ‘Occupied’ Haiti’, Political and Legal Anthropology
Review, Vol.35, No.2, 2012, pp.248–70.
16. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, ‘Rethinking Weberian Approaches to Statebuilding’, in David Chandler
and Timothy Sisk (eds), Routledge Handbook of International Statebuilding, London: Routledge,
2013, pp.3–14; Sonja Grimm, Nicolas Lemay-He´bert and Olivier Nay, “Fragile States”:
Introducing a Political Concept’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.35, No.2, 2014.
17. Sebastian Von Einsiedel and David Malone, ‘Haiti’, in David Malone (ed.), The UN Security
Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004, p.467.
18. Paul Jackson, ‘Security Sector Reform and State Building’, Third World Quarterly, Vol.32,
No.10, 2011, p.1804.
19. Farmer (see n.3 above), pp.151–2.
20. Kivland (see n.15 above), pp.257–8
210 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 01
:38
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
21. Michel-Rolph Trouillot, Haiti State Against Nation: The Origins & Legacy of Duvalierism,
New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990, p.81; Michel-Rolph Trouillot, ‘The Anthropology of
the State in the Age of Globalization: Close Encounters of the Deceptive Kind’, Current Anthro-
pology, Vol.42, No.1, 2001, p.132.
22. Roger Mac Ginty, International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance: Hybrid Forms of Peace,
London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp.10–11.
23. James Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1985, p.49.
24. Laura Zanotti, ‘Imagining Democracy, Building Unsustainable Institutions: The UN Peacekeep-
ing Operation in Haiti’, Security Dialogue, Vol.39, No.5, 2008, p.541.
25. David Nicholls, From Dessalines to Duvalier: Race, Colour and National Independence in Haiti,
New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996.
26. Robert Maguire, Demilitarizing Public Order in a Predatory State: The Case of Haiti, Coral
Gables: North-South Center Press, 1995.
27. Marlye Ge´lin-Adams and David Malone, ‘Haiti: A Case of Endemic Weakness’, in Robert
Rotberg (ed.), State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution Press, 2003, p.290.
28. Robert Fatton Jr., ‘The Saturnalia of Emancipation and the Vicissitudes of Predatory Rule’, Third
World Quarterly, Vol.27, No.1, 2006, p.118.
29. Lundahl (see n.1 above), pp.3–14.
30. Ge´lin-Adams and Malone (see n.27 above), p.291.
31. Fatton Jr. (see n.28 above), p.118.
32. Scott (see n.23 above), xvi.
33. Laurent Dubois, Haiti: The Aftershocks of History, New York: Metropolitan Books, 2012,
p.278; Jean Casimir, La Culture Opprime´e [The Oppressed Culture]. Delmas: Lakay, 2001.
34. Robert Fatton Jr., The Roots of Haitian Despotism, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007, p.63.
35. Lundahl (see n.1 above), p.47.
36. Dubois (see n.33 above), p.278.
37. Ge´lin-Adams and Malone (see n.27 above), p.293; Hans Schmidt, The United States Occupation
of Haiti 1915–1934, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1995.
38. Peter Hallward, Damming The Flood: Haiti and The Politics of Containment, London: Verso,
2010, p.xxvi.
39. Fatton Jr. (see n.34 above), p.75; Ge´rard Barthe´le´my, L’Univers Rural Haı¨tien: Le Pays en
Dehors [The Rural Haitian Universe: The Outside Country], Port-au-Prince: Henri Deschamps,
1989.
40. Nicholls (see n.25 above).
41. Fatton Jr. (see n.28), p.123.
42. As noted by Mobekk, in police departments where former FADH were included, corruption was
higher. Eirin Mobekk, ‘MINUSTAH and the Need for a Context-Specific Strategy: The Case of
Haiti’, in Heiner Ha¨nggi and Vincenza Scherrer (eds), Security Sector Reform and UN Integrated
Missions: Experience from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti and Kosovo,
Geneva: DCAF, 2008, pp.121–2.
43. Mendelson-Forman (see n.14 above), p.15.
44. International Peace Academy, ‘Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti’, IPA Seminar Report,
23–24 January 2002; Timothy Donais, ‘Back to Square One: The Politics of Police Reform in
Haiti’, Civil Wars, Vol.7, No.3, 2005, pp.270–87.
45. Erica Caple James, Democratic Insecurities: Violence, Trauma and Intervention in Haiti, Berke-
ley, CA: University of California Press, 2010, p.3.
46. John Fishel, ‘Old Principles, New Realities: Measuring Army Effectiveness in Operation Uphold
Democracy’, in Walter Kretchik, Robert Baumann and John Fishel (eds), Invasion, Intervention,
‘Intervasion’: A Concise History of the US Army in Operation Uphold Democracy, Fort Leaven-
worth: US Army Command and General Staff College Press, 1998, p.171.
47. Ibid., p.171.
48. Alex Dupuy, The Prophet and Power: Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the International Community, and
Haiti, Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2007, pp.179–80.
49. For an overview of MINUSTAH’s accomplishments, see: Timothy Donais, ‘Reforming the
Haitian National Police: From Stabilization to Consolidation’, in Jorge Heine and Andrew
Thompson (eds), Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH and Beyond, Tokyo: United Nations University
Press, 2011, pp.97–114; Mobekk (see n.42 above).
50. Jeb Sprague, Paramilitarism and the Assault on Democracy in Haiti, New York: Monthly Review
Press, 2012, p.15.
RESISTANCE IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA 211
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 01
:38
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
51. Donais (see n.49 above), p.101.
52. Mobekk (see n.42 above), p.125. An analysis confirmed by a top UN official in an anonymous
interview. Interview by author with UN official, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 Dec. 2011.
53. See Lemay-He´bert (see n.10 above), p.204; and Lemay-He´bert (see n.6 above).
54. See Re´ginald Dumas, An Encounter with Haiti: Notes of a Special Adviser, Medianet: Port of
Spain, 2008; Farmer (see n.3 above); Arnaud Robert, ‘Haı¨ti est la preuve de l’e´chec de l’aide inter-
nationale [Haiti is the Proof of the Failure of International Aid]’, Le Temps, 20 Dec. 2010; Inter-
views by author with MINUSTAH officials in 2011.
55. Farmer (see n.3 above), p.144.
56. As Kevin Kennedy, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary General noted in a per-
sonal interview, it might be an occupation, but ‘with a lesser case ‘o”.’ Interview by author
with Kevin Kennedy, DSRSG MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 2 Feb. 2011.
57. Bri Kouri Nouve`l Gaye et al., ‘Haiti’s Renewal of MINUSTAH’s Mandate in Violation of the
Human Rights of the Haitian People’, 24 Mar. 2011, submission to the UN Universal Periodic
Review (UPR), Twelfth Session of the Working Group on the UPR Human Rights Council,
Oct. 2011.
58. Joe Vaccarello, ‘Three Pakistani Police Officers Found Guilty of Sex Exploitation of 14-year-old
in Haiti’, CNN, 13 Mar. 2012.
59. ‘Uruguayan UN Peacekeepers Charged with ‘Coercion’’, AFP, 27 Aug. 2012.
60. Interview by author with Daly Valet, Editor in chief, Le Matin newspaper, Port-au-Prince, 1 Feb.
2011.
61. Re´ginald Dumas, ‘Haiti and the Regional and International Communities Since January 12,
2010′, Address in the Conference From Duvalier To Pre´val: Haiti Today, Yesterday And Tomor-
row, Institute For the Study of the Americas, University of London, 21–22 Jun. 2010, p.48;
George Russell, ‘With Haiti in Ruins, Some U.N. Relief Workers Live Large on ‘Love Boat’’, Fox-
News.com, 8 Apr. 2010.
62. Lemay-He´bert (see n.6 above).
63. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, ‘Everyday Legitimacy and International Administration: Global Govern-
ance and Local Legitimacy in Kosovo’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.7, No.1,
2013, pp.87–104.
64. Henriette Lunde, The Violent Lifeworlds of Young Haitians Gangs as Livelihood in a Port-au-
Prince Ghetto, Haiti Youth Project, Fafo Paper No.3, 2012, p.7.
65. For a good account of the debated origin of the epidemic, see: Lundahl (see n.1 above), pp.195–9.
66. Mark Doyle, ‘Haiti Cholera Victims Threaten to Sue the UN’, Guardian, 8 May 2013; Farmer
(see n.3 above), pp.195–6.
67. Farmer (see n.3 above), p.193.
68. Valet (see n.60 above).
69. Interview by author with Louis Riccardo Chachoute, adviser to the Ministry of Justice, Port-au-
Prince, 8 Dec. 2011.
70. Interview by the author with Pedro Braum, Viva Rio, Port-au-Prince, 3 Feb. 2011; Dan Beeton,
‘Soldiers Without a Cause: Why Are Thousands of UN Troops Still in Haiti?’, NACLA Report on
the Americas, Spring 2012.
71. Farmer (see n.3 above), p.196; Dan Coughlin, ‘WikiLeaks Haiti: US Cables Paint Portrait of
Brutal, Ineffectual and Polluting UN Force’, The Nation, 6 Oct. 2011.
72. Michael Dziedzic and Robert Perito, ‘Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince’, USIP
Special Report 208, Sept. 2008; Mary Pace and Ketty Luzincourt, ‘Haiti’s Fragile Peace: A
Case Study of the Cumulative Impacts of Peace Practice’, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects,
Nov. 2009, pp.37–8.
73. Grant Gordon and Lauren Young, ‘Haitian Perspectives on MINUSTAH Before the Mandate
Renewal’, 2011 (at: http://peacekeepingfrombelow.files.wordpress.com/2011/10/gordon-young-
minustah-opinions-oct-20113.pdf).
74. Mark Shuller, ‘Haitian People Want UN Troops to Leave’, Counterpunch, 13 Feb. 2012.
75. Nicolas Lemay-He´bert, ‘Statebuilding Without Nation-Building? Legitimacy, State Failure and
the Limits of the Institutionalist Approach’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol.3,
No.1, 2009, pp.21–45.
76. Fatton Jr. (see n.34 above), p.212.
77. ‘Operation Baghdad’ was the name given the ghetto uprising by the interim government in an
attempt to label the people fighting as terrorists. However, the term was later adopted by the
demonstrators themselves. Lunde (see n.64 above), pp.16–7.
78. Dupuy (see n.48 above), p.182.
79. Coughlin (see n.71 above).
212 INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 01
:38
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
80. Robert Fatton Jr., ‘Haiti’s Unending Crisis of Governance: Food, the Constitution and the
Struggle for Power’, in Jorge Heine and Andrew Thompson (eds), Fixing Haiti: MINUSTAH
and Beyond, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011, p.61; Andrew Buncombe, ‘Civilians
Caught in Crossfire during Port-au-Prince Raids’, Independent, 2 Feb. 2007.
81. Robert Muggah, ‘The Effects of Stabilisation on Humanitarian Action in Haiti’, Disasters,
Vol.34, No.S3, 2010, p.7.
82. Quoted in Farmer (see n.3 above), p.136.
83. Alys Willman and Louis-Herns Marcelin, ‘If They Could Make Us Disappear, They Would!
Youth and Violence in Cite´ Soleil, Haiti’, Journal of Community Psychology, Vol.38, No.4,
2010, p.515.
84. Ame´lie Gauthier and Pierre Bonin, ‘Haiti: Voices of the Actors: A Research Project on the UN
Mission’, FRIDE Working Paper 52, Jan. 2008, p.4.
85. Braum (see n.70 above); Beeton (see n.70 above).
86. Muggah (see n.81), p.11.
87. International Crisis Group, ‘Towards a Post-MINUSTAH Haiti: Making an Effective Tran-
sition’, Latin America/Caribbean Report No.44, 2 Aug. 2012, p.8.
88. Interview by author with Stephanie Ziebell, Monitoring & Evaluation Unit Team Leader, Com-
munity Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 Dec. 2011 (interview trans-
lated from French).
89. Interview by author with Dieusibon Pierre-Me´rite´, CVR Officer, Community Violence Reduction
Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 Dec. 2011,; and Jacques Juvigny, CVR Officer, Commu-
nity Violence Reduction Section, MINUSTAH, Port-au-Prince, 8 Dec.2011 (interviews translated
from French).
90. ICG (see n.87 above), p.8.
91. Willman and Marcelin (see n.83 above), p.520; Lunde (see n.64 above).
92. Coughlin (see n.71 above).
93. Nur Hasan et al., ‘Genomic Diversity of 2010 Haitian Cholera Outbreak Strains’, Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol.109, No.29, 2012. The
perfect storm theory has been considered ‘a perfect lie’ by French epidemiologist Renaud Piar-
roux, who wrote an initial report on the cholera outbreak in Haiti Trenton Daniel ‘Source of
Haiti Cholera Bug Goes Under Microscope’, Associated Press, 17 Jul. 2012.
94. See the Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti website (at: www.ijdh.org/cholera-litigation/
#.UdPzbeBcOQs).
95. Interview by author with Frantz Duval, Editor in chief, Le Nouvelliste newspaper, Port-
au-Prince, 2 Feb. 2011.
96. Fatton Jr. (see n.80 above), p.41.
RESISTANCE IN THE TIME OF CHOLERA 213
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 01
:38
 25
 Ju
ne
 20
14
 
